U.S. Supreme Court Affirms States’ Right to Ban Transgender Athletes from Competing in Female Sports

07.06.2026

On June 30, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed that States may enact laws excluding transgender athletes from competing in girls’ and women’s sports without violating Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (“Title IX”) or the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. (West Virginia et al. v. B.P.J. by her next friend and mother, Heather Jackson (“B.P.J.”) and Bradley Little, Governor of Idaho, et al. v. Lindsay Hecox (“Hecox”) 609 U.S. ____ (2026).) California law currently requires school districts to allow transgender athletes to participate consistent with their gender identity

It must be underscored that the Supreme Court’s decision does not in any way require States to enact bans similar to the ones enacted by West Virginia or Idaho. Further, in its opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court makes clear that it did not address “whether, under Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause, schools may allow biological males who identify as female to participate on girls’ and women’s sports teams,” explaining “[t]hat [this] question is currently the subject of litigation in some lower courts,” and that “[n]othing in [its] opinion is intended to decide that question.” The U.S. Supreme Court further clarified that “nothing in [its] opinion should be interpreted to address or limit participation by biological females in male or co-ed sports teams.”

Factual and Procedural Background:

The U.S. Supreme Court considered two distinct fact patterns in issuing this decision. In B.P.J., a transgender West Virginia high school student, B.P.J., sought to continue competing in girls’ cross-country and track-and-field after the State enacted the Save Women’s Sports Act, which bars biological male athletes from female sports. A District Court initially enjoined enforcement but later granted summary judgment for the State of West Virgina, concluding it could bar B.P.J. from participation; the Fourth Circuit re-instated the injunction pending review, then reversed and remanded for further fact-finding. In Hecox, a transgender Idaho college student sought to continue competing in intercollegiate women’s sports after the Idaho enacted the Fairness in Women’s Sports Act, a law substantially similar to the one enacted by West Virginia. A District Court enjoined enforcement, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

U.S. Supreme Court Decision:

The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that, under Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause, States are legally allowed to maintain separate athletic teams based on biological sex. The majority reasoned that Title IX permits educational agencies to maintain separate women’s and men’s sporting teams and that under Title IX, the term “sex” necessarily refers to “biological sex” because that was the ordinary meaning of the term “sex” in the early 1970’s when the legislature enacted Title IX. The U.S. Supreme Court applied “intermediate scrutiny” to the equal protection[1] analysis, which permits States to implement sex-based classifications so long as they are “substantially related” to achieving an “important governmental objective.” The majority reasoned that West Virginia and Idaho satisfied “intermediate scrutiny” because they possessed an important interest in the safety of female athletes and competitive parity in female sports. The majority agreed with the States’ arguments that permitting transgender female athletes to participate in female sports compromised these interests, and therefore the statutes were “substantially related” to the States’ interests.

The U.S. Supreme Court also considered whether States must conduct individualized assessments to determine whether a specific athlete’s participation would create safety risks or undermine competitive fairness. The majority concluded that States are not constitutionally required to do so under the Equal Protection Clause or its precedent, and further reasoned, in part, that doing so would create “an enormous and administrability problem . . . if courts suddenly had to make such individualized exemptions.”

B.P.J. argued that transgender females who have taken puberty blockers or began hormonal therapy at an early age should be permitted to participate in female athletics under Title IX, and if not, the regulations are not “reasonable” as required by the Javits[2] Amendment. The majority disagreed, stating that Title IX’s regulations do not speak to the effects of puberty blockers or hormonal therapy. In determining the “reasonableness” of this interpretation of the governing regulations, the majority cited the 27 States and two competitive athletic bodies (NCAA and U.S. Olympic and Paralympic Committee) that have barred transgender female athletes from competing in female athletics.

Ultimately, the majority was unpersuaded by Petitioners’ arguments and held that States do not run afoul of Title IX or the Equal Protection Clause of the United States if they choose to exclude transgender female athletes from participating in girls’ and women’s sports. However, the U.S. Supreme Court made clear that its ruling was limited, as referenced above.

Impact on Educational Agencies:

While this decision affirms States’ rights to exclude transgender athletes from girl’s and women’s sports, the decision does not require that all States follow the laws adopted by Idaho and West Virginia. California law currently requires school districts to allow transgender athletes to participate consistent with their gender identity, and the U.S. Supreme Court explained that its decision does not address that issue[3]. The U.S. Supreme Court also stated that nothing in its opinion should be interpreted to address or limit participation by biological females on male or co-ed sports teams, and the opinion did not address access to facilities such as bathrooms or locker rooms. Because this decision only addressed whether States may prohibit transgender athletes from participating in sports consistent with their gender identity, California school districts must continue to comply with California law and, pursuant to Education Code section 35160, cannot adopt local policies that conflict with California law.

It is anticipated that litigation will continue[4] regarding the issues left unresolved by this decision. AALRR will continue to follow any legal and policy developments related to this area of the law.

If you have any questions regarding the content of this alert, please contact the authors or your usual AALRR counsel.

[1] B.P.J. asserted that barring her from competing in sports violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment, as well as Title IX.

[2] Title IX was enacted in 1972 and required that no person shall be excluded from participation on the basis of sex in any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. In 1974, Congress passed the “Javits Amendment” requiring the development of “reasonable” regulations to implement Title IX.

[3] California Education Code section 221.5(f) provides “A pupil shall be permitted to participate in sex-segregated school programs and activities, including athletic teams and competitions, and use facilities consistent with his or her gender identity, irrespective of the gender listed on the pupil’s records.”

[4] On July 9, 2025, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a complaint against the California Department of Education and the California Interscholastic Federation challenging California’s laws and policies that allow students to participate in athletic programs and use facilities based on their gender identity. As of the date of this alert, this lawsuit is pending in U.S. District Court for the Central District of California and California law remains valid.