Business Law Journal

The involved lease terms are an “Indemnification” provision, which immunizes the landlord from liability except for gross negligence or intentional misconduct, and a “Limitation of Liability” provision in which the tenant waived all claims for consequential damages or loss of business or profits.  

This lawsuit arose from the failure of the defendant landlord to disclose to a prospective tenant the presence of hazardous substances.  Specifically, landlord never advised the plaintiff tenant that the two greenhouses they were renting for commercial orchid cultivation contained asbestos and lead paint.  Landlord knew about the presence of these materials when it purchased the property two years earlier, when it entered into the lease with plaintiff, and when it repaired damage to the property caused by a storm.   Disclosure is required under the Health & Safety Code.  

At the time that landlord showed the property to plaintiff pre-lease, it did not disclose the asbestos or lead paint.  Landlord believed that disclosure was not required because of general language in the lease regarding hazardous materials.  Landlord also believed that, because the tenant planned to rebuild the greenhouses, the asbestos would no longer be exposed to the elements and thus would no longer be hazardous.  

After a storm damaged the greenhouses, landlord voluntarily undertook repairs, even though the lease allocated the cost of repair to the tenant.  As before, landlord made no disclosure to plaintiff, instead arguing that the third-party company it hired to do the repairs could determine if disclosure was needed.  Eventually, the county quarantined the premises because of friable asbestos in the air and on the ground.  

After the repairs had been completed, tenant tested some remaining debris, and found asbestos and lead paint.  Tenant thereafter filed this lawsuit based on landlord’s non-disclosure.  By special verdict, the jury found landlord liable for premises liability and negligence.  The jury found that landlord failed to disclose, but without intent to deceive, so landlord was not liable for concealment.  Defendant was found not liable on causes of action for intentional misrepresentation, breach of contract based on fraud, unjust enrichment, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unfair business practices.  Damages were awarded against landlord.  

After trial, landlord filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict based on the waiver of consequential damages in the lease and the jury’s finding that it was liable only for negligence.  The court granted the motion.  

This appeal followed.   The Court of Appeal reversed.  

The Court of Appeal ruled that the “Indemnification clause,” in which tenant waived all liability except for liability based on “gross negligence or intentional misconduct,” did not exonerate landlord.  This is because, though there was no special verdict finding gross negligence, the trial court had instructed the jury that defendants were not responsible for plaintiff’s harm, unless the jury found that defendants were grossly negligent, committed fraud, or intended to harm the plaintiff.   In light of this jury instruction, the Court of Appeal ruled that, by awarding damages, the jury necessarily found defendant to be grossly negligent.  A special verdict on this issue was not required.  

Having reached this legal conclusion, the Court of Appeal then reviewed the facts to confirm that defendant’s acts satisfied the definition of gross negligence in the jury instruction.   It easily did so.  

The Court of Appeal also ruled that the “Limitation of Liability” clause, in which tenant waived all claims for consequential damages or loss of business or profits, did not exonerate landlord.  Because defendant’s negligence arose from failing to comply with the Health & Safety Code, defendants were liable for negligence per se.  No special verdict was needed,  because the single cause of action for negligence included both gross negligence and negligence per se.  The jury necessarily found landlord liable based on statutory violations because this was the only theory on which the jury could base its negligence finding.  

The Court of Appeal stated that parties to a lease may agree to limit liability for breaches of covenants in the lease, but not for tort liability.  Under Civil Code section 1668, any clause which attempts to exempt someone from liability for their own fraud, willful injury to another, or violation of law, is void as contrary to public policy.  

Thus, to the extent that it purports to shield defendant from liability for its failure to disclose the presence of asbestos, the “Limitation of Liability” provision in this case is void as against public policy.  

Though the outcome of this case is disappointing for landlords, the opinion can also be read to provide guidance to landlords in the future.  If you have any questions about your lease, or any other questions about real property issues, please contact the author of this article or your usual AALRR attorney and trusted advisor.

The involved lease terms are an “Indemnification” provision, which immunizes the landlord from liability except for gross negligence or intentional misconduct, and a “Limitation of Liability” provision in which the tenant waived all claims for consequential damages or loss of business or profits.  

This lawsuit arose from the failure of the defendant landlord to disclose to a prospective tenant the presence of hazardous substances.  Specifically, landlord never advised the plaintiff tenant that the two greenhouses they were renting for commercial orchid cultivation contained asbestos and lead paint.  Landlord knew about the presence of these materials when it purchased the property two years earlier, when it entered into the lease with plaintiff, and when it repaired damage to the property caused by a storm.   Disclosure is required under the Health & Safety Code.  

At the time that landlord showed the property to plaintiff pre-lease, it did not disclose the asbestos or lead paint.  Landlord believed that disclosure was not required because of general language in the lease regarding hazardous materials.  Landlord also believed that, because the tenant planned to rebuild the greenhouses, the asbestos would no longer be exposed to the elements and thus would no longer be hazardous.  

After a storm damaged the greenhouses, landlord voluntarily undertook repairs, even though the lease allocated the cost of repair to the tenant.  As before, landlord made no disclosure to plaintiff, instead arguing that the third-party company it hired to do the repairs could determine if disclosure was needed.  Eventually, the county quarantined the premises because of friable asbestos in the air and on the ground.  

After the repairs had been completed, tenant tested some remaining debris, and found asbestos and lead paint.  Tenant thereafter filed this lawsuit based on landlord’s non-disclosure.  By special verdict, the jury found landlord liable for premises liability and negligence.  The jury found that landlord failed to disclose, but without intent to deceive, so landlord was not liable for concealment.  Defendant was found not liable on causes of action for intentional misrepresentation, breach of contract based on fraud, unjust enrichment, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unfair business practices.  Damages were awarded against landlord.  

After trial, landlord filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict based on the waiver of consequential damages in the lease and the jury’s finding that it was liable only for negligence.  The court granted the motion.  

This appeal followed.   The Court of Appeal reversed.  

The Court of Appeal ruled that the “Indemnification clause,” in which tenant waived all liability except for liability based on “gross negligence or intentional misconduct,” did not exonerate landlord.  This is because, though there was no special verdict finding gross negligence, the trial court had instructed the jury that defendants were not responsible for plaintiff’s harm, unless the jury found that defendants were grossly negligent, committed fraud, or intended to harm the plaintiff.   In light of this jury instruction, the Court of Appeal ruled that, by awarding damages, the jury necessarily found defendant to be grossly negligent.  A special verdict on this issue was not required.  

Having reached this legal conclusion, the Court of Appeal then reviewed the facts to confirm that defendant’s acts satisfied the definition of gross negligence in the jury instruction.   It easily did so.  

The Court of Appeal also ruled that the “Limitation of Liability” clause, in which tenant waived all claims for consequential damages or loss of business or profits, did not exonerate landlord.  Because defendant’s negligence arose from failing to comply with the Health & Safety Code, defendants were liable for negligence per se.  No special verdict was needed,  because the single cause of action for negligence included both gross negligence and negligence per se.  The jury necessarily found landlord liable based on statutory violations because this was the only theory on which the jury could base its negligence finding.  

The Court of Appeal stated that parties to a lease may agree to limit liability for breaches of covenants in the lease, but not for tort liability.  Under Civil Code section 1668, any clause which attempts to exempt someone from liability for their own fraud, willful injury to another, or violation of law, is void as contrary to public policy.  

Thus, to the extent that it purports to shield defendant from liability for its failure to disclose the presence of asbestos, the “Limitation of Liability” provision in this case is void as against public policy.  

Though the outcome of this case is disappointing for landlords, the opinion can also be read to provide guidance to landlords in the future.  If you have any questions about your lease, or any other questions about real property issues, please contact the author of this article or your usual AALRR attorney and trusted advisor.

This AALRR post is intended for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon in reaching a conclusion in a particular area of law. Applicability of the legal principles discussed may differ substantially in individual situations. Receipt of this or any other AALRR publication does not create an attorney-client relationship. The Firm is not responsible for inadvertent errors that may occur in the publishing process. 
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